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Impression management (IM), especially deceptive IM (faking), is a cause for concern in
selection interviews. The current study combines findings on lie detection with signaling
theory to address how candidates’ deceptive versus honest IM shows in verbal deception
cues, which then relate to interview ratings of candidates’ interview performance. After
completing a structured interview rated by two trained interviewers, 182 candidates
reported their deceptive and honest IM. Verbal deception cues (plausibility, verbal
uncertainty) were coded from video recordings. Results supported the hypotheses:
Deceptive IM directly raised interviewer ratings (intended positive signal) but lowered the
responses’ plausibility and enhanced verbal uncertainties (unintended negative signals).
Honest IM raised responses’ plausibility. Plausibility related positively to interviewer ratings
(receiver reaction), thus accounting for a negative indirect effect of deceptive IM and a
positive indirect effect of honest IM on interviewer ratings. This study contributes to theory
and practice regarding faking detection in employment interviews.

A longstanding concern in employment interviewing
is candidates’ impression management (IM). The use of
IM can be understood in terms of signaling theory, which
argues that a signaler (candidates) may intentionally adjust
the signals sent to a receiver (interviewers; Bangerter et al.,
2012; Roulin et al., 2016). More specifically, candidates
may fake—that is, consciously misrepresent their skills,
abilities, and other favorable characteristics (deceptive
IM)—and/or they may present themselves honestly (honest
IM; Bourdage et al., 2018; Levashina & Campion, 2006;
Roulin et al., 2016). If candidates fake successfully, this
provides an undue advantage for fakers over honest candidates and threatens the interview’s criterion-related validity.
In short, interviewers need to differentiate deceptive from
honest signals to detect candidates’ faking. Consequently,
the interview requires interviewers to interpret whatever
signal—intended or unintended—they receive (Connelly et
al., 2011).
Fortunately, research on lie detection suggests that deceptive IM might show, at least in theory (Vrij et al., 2010,
2019): When people lie, they send unintended negative signals that may give away their untruthfulness. Unfortunately, many such clues have failed to translate into interview
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settings (Roulin & Powell, 2018; Schneider et al., 2015).
What still appears promising to study are certain verbal
cues: a lower plausibility of responses and more verbal
uncertainties (DePaulo et al., 2003) that may help to “set
liars’ pants on fire.” Therefore, we aim to capture differences in verbal deception cues between deceptive and honest
IM and study these cues’ effects on interviewers’ ratings of
candidates’ responses.
The current study makes the following three contributions. First, we contribute to research on deceptive and
honest IM in interviews. Past research on IM’s effects on
interview performance (Melchers et al., 2020) yielded
conflicting results, with studies reporting positive (e.g.,
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Levashina & Campion, 2007), no (e.g., Bourdage et al.,
2018), or negative relationships between deceptive IM and
interview performance (e.g., Swider et al., 2011). We aim
to contribute to this debate by addressing deceptive versus
honest IM from a signaling perspective. Candidates use
both honest and deceptive IM to signal their suitability. Yet,
deceptive IM evokes unintended negative signals that may
reduce interview ratings and thus neutralize faking effectiveness. For practice, we aim to show how small verbal
cues reveal deceptive IM. Second, the study adds to the
literature on signaling theory. Although the theory includes
unintended negative signals, empirical research on such
signals is still rare (Connelly et al., 2011). The current study
offers a well-founded operationalization of such phenomena by borrowing from research on lie detection. Third and
final, the study may add to the literature on structured interviews. One of this literature’s truisms is the reliance on predetermined scoring guides based on a job analysis (Campion
et al., 1997). The current study identifies verbal cues not
included in such scoring guides that may yet be informative
for good conceptual reasons.
Signaling Theory and Impression Management (IM)
Signaling theory describes how two parties with asymmetric knowledge exchange information (Connelly et al.,
2011). The idea is that one party (signaler) is an insider
with positive and negative information about something of
interest, like a product, a person, or an organization (e.g.,
Mavlanova et al., 2012). The other party (receiver) is an
outsider, who does not have but needs this unbiased information to make a good decision on their own.
The issue is that the signaler may not be neutral and
might benefit from the decision leaning one way or another.
Consequently, the signaler might not want to convey all information equally. They may only present information positive to their cause (i.e., positive signals) while choosing to
omit negative information (i.e., negative signals; Connelly
et al., 2011). In other words, the signaler might benefit from
a selective presentation of information and possibly even
deceit at the receiver’s expense (e.g., Bird & Smith, 2005).
When successful, the signaler may even direct the receiver
toward a decision that the receiver might not have made
had they known all the information available (Connelly et
al., 2011).
Receivers are not necessarily naïve toward the signaler’s interests but must be attentive to both intended and
unintended signals that speak for or against the signaler’s
veracity.
Signaling theory has been influential in domains as diverse as marketing (e.g., Dunham, 2011), strategic entrepreneurship (Connelly et al., 2011), and selection and recruitment (e.g., Wilhelmy et al., 2019). Employment interviews
are classic situations of information asymmetry between
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candidates and interviewers. Candidates are insiders to their
own strengths and weaknesses. Interviewers are outsiders
who need unbiased information on candidates to decide
whether to hire them or not. This asymmetry both invites
candidates to shape the signals they send about how they
like to be perceived (Bangerter et al., 2012) and requires interviewers to interpret whatever signals they receive (Connelly et al., 2011). Most candidates intentionally employ
IM to signal that they are suitable candidates (Roulin et
al., 2016). Yet, depending on whether candidates’ IM is deceptive or honest, they may also send unintentional signals
(e.g., deception cues versus signals of credibility/veracity/
reliability; cf., Connelly et al., 2011; DePaulo et al., 2003).
IM as Intended Positive Signals
Interviews offer external candidates unique opportunities to signal their suitability for the job in question (Bangerter et al., 2012). Interviews thus invite IM, the manipulation of the impression that candidates make on interviewers
(Levashina & Campion, 2006). In terms of signaling theory,
candidates’ IM usually implies sending intentional positive
signals about oneself (cf., Roulin et al., 2016). These signals can be deceptive and/or honest IM.
Deceptive IM. Deceptive IM (i.e., faking) is common
in interviews (Levashina & Campion, 2007). With deceptive IM, candidates intentionally and deceptively attempt
to misrepresent themselves (Levashina & Campion, 2006;
Roulin et al., 2016). Tactics include slight and extensive image creation (exaggerating existing experiences and actions,
and/or claiming experiences and accomplishments that one
does not have), deceptive ingratiation (wrongly claiming
to hold the same values or attitudes as the interviewer or
organization), and image protection (omitting or concealing
undesirable information; Levashina & Campion, 2007).
Honest IM. Honest IM is a form of honest self-presentation by which candidates truthfully describe and express
their job-related abilities, accomplishments, experiences,
attitudes, or values (Bourdage et al., 2018). Honest IM
encompasses honest self-promotion (emphasizing existing
skills and experiences; Bourdage et al., 2018), honest ingratiation (voicing appreciation and highlighting their similar
values to the organization or interviewer; Kristof-Brown et
al., 2002), and honest defensive IM (image protection via
sincere apologies, excuses, and justifications; Bolino et al.,
2008).
Effects of IM on interview ratings. In terms of signaling theory, both deceptive and honest IM aim to convince
the receiver of the sender’s suitability (Connelly et al.,
2011). They thus likely foster interviewers’ ratings of candidates’ responses. Empirically, relationships between deceptive IM and interviewers’ ratings range from small negative
to moderate positive correlations (Melchers et al., 2020).
Some of this variance in findings might be methodological
though, with not all studies assessing faking directly af-
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ter the interview but sometimes days or weeks later (e.g.,
Bourdage et al., 2018). Studies assessing faking directly
after the interview tend to report more positive relationships
(cf., Buehl & Melchers, 2017; Ingold et al., 2015). Honest IM shows an overall positive relationship to interview
ratings and hiring recommendations (e.g., Bourdage et al.,
2018; Kleinmann & Klehe, 2010; Roulin et al., 2014), even
though these benefits seem to flatten out with excessive IM
(Robie et al., 2020). We thus assume that:
Hypothesis 1: Candidates’ (a) deceptive IM and (b)
honest IM show direct positive relationships with interviewers’ ratings of candidates’ interview performance.
Deception Cues as Unintended Negative Signals
Nobody wants to fall prey to a liar. In the language of
signaling theory, the receiver depends on the signaler providing unbiased information for making a good decision
but may also know that the signaler has a vested interest in
that decision. In short, the receiver may attend not only to
the intended signals that the signaler provides but also to
unintended ones about the signaler’s credibility.
Unintentional deception cues may emerge in verbal or
nonverbal behavior (DePaulo et al., 2003) or in the content
of what people say (e.g., criteria-based content analysis,
CBCA; Amado et al., 2016). Translating this to the selection context, Culbertson et al. (2016) explicitly asked
participants to lie or tell the truth in a mock employment
interview. Under the lying condition, interviewers indeed
spotted participants who showed various deception cues.
However, explicitly asking participants to lie may overestimate faking results (cf., Birkeland et al., 2006). Studies observing the more nuanced and subtle deceptive IM
happening during regular selection interviews (Roulin &
Powell, 2018; Schneider et al., 2015) yielded less consistent
results for behavioral cues or CBCA. Behavioral cues may
simply not work as well during selection as anticipated, or
the issue was methodological, with raters rating behavioral
cues only after the complete interview (Schneider et al.,
2015). CBCA, in turn, requires cumbersome interview transcriptions. Again, results were questionable with the overall
analysis but none of the single criteria correlating with deceptive IM (Roulin & Powell, 2018, Study 2).
Still unaddressed in regular interviews are verbal deception cues, most prominently plausibility and verbal
uncertainty (DePaulo et al., 2003). DePaulo et al. (2003),
define a response as “plausible” if the rater considers the
message plausible, likely, or believable. The underlying
idea is that the rater mentally imagines the scenario that the
interviewee describes in an interview response and assesses
whether this scenario is coherent with the rater’s own prior
knowledge or experience (Connell & Keane, 2006). Apparently, different raters agree on what responses they consider
plausible or not (Vrij et al., in press). Studies that randomly
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asked participants to lie or tell the truth suggest plausibility
to help identify lies (e.g., Culbertson et al., 2016; Vrij et al.,
2020). However, we still need further proof of the relationship between plausibility ratings and deceptive IM in regular interviews (cf., Culbertson et al., 2016).
Verbal uncertainties are defined as the interviewee appearing uncertain, insecure, not very assertive, and having
difficulty responding to the question (DePaulo et al., 2003).
Uncertainty reveals itself in the interviewee repeating
phrases, breaking phrases apart, or including half phrases
in their responses (Kraut, 1978). Vrij and Heaven (1999)
experimentally showed that lying alters participants’ speech
patterns. Participants had more difficulties expressing themselves, for example, repeating themselves, forgetting words,
or whole phrases, when lying. These speech errors are distinct from slips of the tongue, as participants did not stutter
more often or use more filler words when lying than when
telling the truth.
If the validity of verbal deception cues generalizes
across contexts (Vrij et al., 2019), these cues can help identify deceptive IM in employment interviews. They may thus
present unintended, yet externally observable, signals of
candidates’ lacking credibility.
Hypothesis 2: The more candidates employ deceptive
IM, (a) the less plausible their responses will be and (b)
the more verbal uncertainties they will show.
Regarding honest IM, we assume opposite effects.
Although honest and deceptive IM correlate positively
(Bourdage et al., 2018), honest IM implies that candidates
draw from actual attitudes, experiences, and accomplishments. With no need to hastily construct a story, candidates’
speech likely is more fluent. They may offer up details and
information that allow a more complete and thus plausible
picture of their responses than if they had remained silent,
thus (unintentionally) signaling credibility and poise (cf.,
Durcikova & Gray, 2009). Therefore, we assume:
Hypothesis 3: The more candidates employ honest IM,
(a) the more plausible their responses will be and (b)
the less verbal uncertainties they will show.
Impact of Unintended Signals on Interview Ratings
Low plausibility and high verbal uncertainties may
not only be unintended but may also function as negative
signals to interviewers regarding candidates’ credibility
and thus suitability (cf., Connelly et al., 2011). Classic
scoring recommendations instruct interviewers to focus
solely on the content-related fit of candidates’ responses to
a standardized job-related scoring guide (e.g., Latham et
al., 1980). Nevertheless, we assume interviewers will react
negatively to either deception cue. If a candidate’s response
lacks plausibility or if the candidate appears to have diffi-
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culties expressing what they want to convey, interviewers
might be more skeptical about the response and rate it lower. Although not addressed in previous research, such an
assumption fits practical recommendations. These advise
candidates to ensure a (verbal and vocal) self-assured appearance and their statements’ plausibility to improve the
interviewers’ impression (cf., Dondolo & Chinyamurindi,
2018; Hebbani & Frey, 2007).
Hypothesis 4: (a) The plausibility of candidates’ responses will be positively related to, and (b) verbal uncertainties in candidates’ responses will be negatively
related to, interviewers’ ratings of candidates’ interview
performance.
In summary, we suggest a model with direct and, in
part, opposing indirect effects. Both deceptive and honest
IM may serve as direct positive signals advertising the
candidates’ suitability (Hypothesis 1). However, deceptive
(versus honest) IM may cause subtle verbal deception cues,
unintended negative signals of lacking credibility, which
may impair interviewers’ impressions of candidates’ suitability (Hypotheses 2 to 4). Taken together, Hypotheses 2
to 4 thus suggest a negative indirect effect from deceptive
IM on interview rating and a positive indirect effect from
honest IM on interview performance via the verbal deception cues plausibility and verbal uncertainties.

any of the other parties involved.
Sample/Candidates
Candidates (N = 182; 101 women, 78 men, three diverse; average age = 23.13 years) were recruited via the
university’s Career Centre. Most studied business (n =
101), followed by psychology (n = 24) and modern languages and cultures (n = 14). About two-thirds were completing their bachelor’s degree (n = 134), the others their
master’s (n = 48). Only a few candidates reported prior
experiences with structured selection interviews containing
behavioral and/or situational questions (n = 15).
Interviewers
Interviewers (N = 21; 16 women, 5 men) were graduate students specializing in work and organizational
psychology. Through random selection, two interviewers
per interview rated each candidates’ responses. They were
extensively trained in the theory and practice of structured
interviewing, particulary that of the current study.

METHOD

Rater of Deception Cues
An independent graduate student in work and organizational psychology was trained to code for plausibility and
verbal uncertainty from the interviews’ video recordings.
For comparison purposes, this rater also coded similar
cues that do not signal deception (slips of the tongue; Vrij
& Heaven, 1999) as well as nonverbal deception cues and
content analysis criteria.

Setting and Design
We conducted the study as a simulated selection procedure, serving as a training program for prospective university graduates. This well-established research paradigm
in personnel selection facilitates the honest assessment
of candidates’ cognitions and actions (Kleinmann et al.,
2011), including faking (e.g., Dürr & Klehe, 2018), in a
realistic context. Prior research has shown that participants
experience these simulations as realistic, behave like they
would during actual personnel selection (Kleinmann &
Ingold, 2019), and that findings from simulations replicate
to actual field settings (e.g., Ingold et al., 2016; Roulin &
Powell, 2018). Candidates underwent a classic structured
panel interview with two interviewers. Although there
was no job at stake, all interviews were recorded on video,
and the top 10% well-performing candidates received €25
each to increase candidates’ level of motivation. After the
interview, candidates learned that the ensuing survey only
served research purposes. They then reported their level of
deceptive and honest IM during the interview. Plausibility
and verbal uncertainty were coded from video recordings
of the interviews. All parties involved, that is, candidates,
interviewers, and the video rater, were blind to the study’s
purpose and to the content and level of ratings provided by

Measures
Deceptive IM. Candidates responded to Dürr and Klehe’s (2018) 17-item short version of Levashina and Campion’s (2007) Interview Faking Scale (e.g., “I claimed that
I have skills that I do not have”) on a 5-point Likert scale
from strongly disagree to strongly agree (α = .91).
Honest IM. Candidates responded to 10 items from
Bourdage et al.’s (2018) honest IM section of the Short IM
Scale (e.g., “I brought up my past work experience to make
the interviewer aware of my competence”) on a 5-point
Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree (α =
.79).
Deception cues. The video rater coded the plausibility
and verbal uncertainty in real time. For every interview
question, the rater recorded on a tablet whenever the respective cue was present, that is, whenever candidates provided
a plausible response or showed difficulties in expressing
themselves. Following DePaulo et al. (2003), a response
was “plausible” if the rater considered the message plausible, likely, or believable, that is, if they could mentally
imagine the scenario that a candidate described, and assessed this scenario as coherent with their prior knowledge
or experience (α = .89). Verbal uncertainties were defined
as candidates appearing uncertain, insecure, or not very
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assertive, and seeming to have difficulty responding to the
question, for example, repeating their phrases, breaking
phrases apart, or forgetting words (α = .74).1 This coding
procedure served to gain more objective information about
the cues than a general rating at the end of the interview.
Videos were played at normal speed without the possibility
of pausing to maintain comparability with the actual interview.
A comparison with 30 interview codings by another
independent rater suggested a perfect agreement on a question level of 59.16% for plausibility and 69.17% for verbal
uncertainty and moderate interrater reliabilities for both
plausibility (ICC = .51) and verbal uncertainty (ICC = .68;
Koo & Li, 2016).
Interview ratings. The interview was fully standardized, nontransparent, and consisted of six behavioral (Janz,
1982) and six situational questions (Latham et al., 1980).
Mirroring Kolk et al.’s (2004) feeling–thinking–power
taxonomy, each interview question targeted one of the dimensions of cooperation, planning, and leadership, three of
the five most frequent dimensions in structured interviews
(Huffcutt et al., 2001). Because the simulated selection
procedure was for university graduates, the behavioral
questions addressed situations in a university context. The
situational questions addressed problems encountered by an
organizational management trainee. Interviewers took extensive notes and rated each response on a classic behavior
rating scale with examples for poor (rating of 1), average
(rating of 3), and outstanding (rating of 5) responses (α =
.79). The interviewers’ interrater reliability was excellent
(ICC = .94).
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
A confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus 8.2 (Muthén
& Muthén, 1998–2018) based on parcels (item-to-construct
relations method; Little et al., 2002) supported the proposed
measurement model with three latent factors (deceptive IM,
honest IM, interview ratings) and two single-item indicators
(plausibility, verbal uncertainty). With average factor loadings ranging from .70 (interview ratings) to .92 (deceptive
IM), the model showed an excellent fit (χ2(36) = 34.68, p =
.531, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .04).
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate
correlations between study variables. Both IM forms tended
to relate positively to interview ratings, even though this
relationship was only statistically significant for deceptive
IM. Women and older candidates tended to score better than
men and younger candidates.2
Hypothesis Testing
We tested hypotheses via structural equation modeling
with Mplus 8.2 using maximum likelihood estimation and
bootstrapping (10,000 draws). The proposed model showed
an excellent fit (χ2(37) = 36.85, p = .476, CFI = 1.00, RM-
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SEA = .00, SRMR = .04) and did not differ from the measurement model (∆χ2(1) = 2.17, p = .141). Figure 1 shows
standardized model coefficients and Table 2 direct, indirect,
and total effects of deceptive and honest IM on interview
ratings.
Supporting Hypothesis 1a, deceptive IM showed a direct positive relationship with interview ratings. Rejecting
Hypothesis 1b, no such relationship emerged for honest IM.
Supporting Hypothesis 2, deceptive IM showed a negative relationship with plausibility and a positive relationship
with verbal uncertainty.
Supporting Hypothesis 3a, honest IM showed a positive relationship with plausibility. Rejecting Hypothesis 3b,
no such relationship emerged for verbal uncertainty.
Supporting Hypothesis 4a, plausibility showed a positive relationship with interview ratings. Rejecting Hypothesis 4b, no such relationship emerged for verbal uncertainty.
Taken together, the indirect effects from IM on interview ratings via verbal deception cues revealed that
deceptive IM had a significant negative and honest IM a
significant positive indirect effect on interview ratings via
plausibility. The indirect effects via verbal uncertainty were
not significant (Table 2).
Additional Analyses
To ensure that effects are not due to a single subfacet
of deceptive or honest IM, we reran analyses with each IM
subfacet separately instead of the overall value. Most results also generalized across subfacets (Table 3). Different
deceptive IM facets related negatively to plausibility (effect
sizes ranging from –.16 for slight image creation to –.25 for
extensive image creation). Plausibility, in turn, accounted
for a significant negative indirect relationship between all
deceptive IM facets and interviewer ratings. Different deceptive IM facets related positively to verbal uncertainty
(effect sizes ranging from –.20 for deceptive ingratiation to
–.36 for image protection). The positive direct effect of
deceptive IM on interview ratings only held for deceptive
ingratiation and image protection. For slight and extensive
image creation, this effect pointed in the proposed direction
but was not significant. The results for honest IM’s subfacets were also similar to those reported in the overall analyses. Honest IM related positively to plausibility (effect sizes
1 To ensure that, compared to earlier research, possible findings
are truly related to the type of deception cue studied and not to our
measurement approach, the rater also coded nonverbal (eye contact, smiling, nodding, head movement, hand gesture; cf., Schneider et al., 2015) and CBCA cues (logical structure, descriptions of
interactions, unstructured production, spontaneous corrections; cf.,
Roulin et al., 2018) with the same real-time coding. Like Schneider
et al. (2015) and Roulin et al. (2018), we found no relationships between deceptive IM and these cues (Table S1 in the Supplementary
Materials).
2 Rerunning analyses with gender and age as control variables
yielded stable results regarding our hypotheses with neither gender (γ = –.11, p = .223, 95% CI [–.26, .04]) nor age (γ = .16, p = .131,
95% CI [–.01, .34]) maintaining their influence on interview ratings.
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TABLE 1.
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables
Variable

M (SD)
a

1. Gender
2. Age
3. Deceptive IM
4. Honest IM
5. Plausibility
6. Verbal uncertainty
7. Interview ratings

.44 (.50)
23.13 (3.15)
1.93 (.59)
2.71 (.61)
5.65 (3.95)
2.55 (2.52)
2.69 (.50)

1

2

3

4

5

6

-.03
–.04
.00
–.02
–.09
–.15*

-–.18*
.05
.12
–.02
.16*

-.25**
–.15*
.25**
.17*

-.23**
–.02
.15

-–.16*
.20**

-.08

Note. N = 182 except for gender and age (N = 179). a0 = female and 1 = male. IM = impression management. The candidates
rated their deceptive and honest IM. A rater coded plausibility and verbal uncertainty via video recordings of the interviews. The
interviewers rated candidates’ responses during the interview. *p < .05. **p < .01.

FIGURE 1.
Conceptual Model of How Organizational Culture Affects Faking in Job Interviews

Note. N = 182. IM = impression management. Model fit indices: χ2(37) = 36.85, p = .476, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00,
SRMR = .04. *p < .05. **p < .01.The candidates rated their deceptive and honest IM. A rater coded plausibility and
verbal uncertainty via video recordings of the interviews. The interviewers rated candidates’ responses during the interview.
ranging from .18 for honest self-promotion to .29 for honest
defensive IM). Plausibility, in turn, accounted for a significant positive indirect effect between all honest IM facets
and interviewer ratings. Similar to honest IM overall, none
of the subfacets were directly related to interview ratings.
DISCUSSION
Building on signaling theory, this study aimed to capture differences in deception cues between deceptive and
honest IM in a structured interview and to study the effect
of these cues on how interviewers rate candidates’ respons-
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es. As expected, deceptive IM showed in less plausible responses and more verbal uncertainties, whereas honest IM
was related to more plausibility. Plausibility of responses
further related positively to interviewers’ ratings, resulting
in a negative indirect effect of deceptive IM versus a positive indirect effect of honest IM on performance ratings.
Thus, plausibility counteracted the direct positive effect
of deceptive IM, although it could not negate this direct
effect. Plausibility also enhanced the direct positive effect
of honest IM on interview ratings. However, in contrast to
deceptive IM, honest IM’s total effect on interview ratings
was not significant.
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TABLE 2.

Direct, Indirect and Total Effects of Impression Management on Rated Interview Ratings
Deceptive IM on interview ratings
Total effect
Direct effect

Estimate

SE

95% CI

Estimate

SE

95% CI

.18

.09

[.02, .31]

.06

.10

[–.11, .23]

.24

.10

[.07, .38]

–.02

.10

[–.19, .15]

Indirect effects of deceptive IM on interview
ratings
Via plausibility
Via verbal uncertainty

Honest IM on interview ratings

Indirect effects of honest IM on interview
ratings

Estimate

SE

95% CI

Estimate

SE

95% CI

–.07

.03

[–.13, –.02]

.09

.04

[.03, .15]

.01

.02

[–.03, .05]

.00

.01

[–.02, .01]

Note. N = 182. IM = impression management. Estimate is standardized coefficient. SE = standard error. CI = confidence interval.

In the words of signaling theory, both deceptive and
honest IM implied that candidates intentionally sent positive signals to interviewers about their suitability, even
though only deceptive and not honest IM seems to have
directly influenced interviewers. Yet, with deceptive IM,
unintended signals indirectly counteract some of the desired
effect. Unlike honest IM, deceptive IM decreased the plausibility of responses, a hard-to-fake signal of candidates’
credibility. Crafting a coherent, plausible story directly
while talking is challenging if the story is untrue (cf., Bangerter et al., 2012; Cronk, 2005). Although not necessarily
consciously, interviewers may interpret low plausibility as a
negative signal and reduce their interview ratings.
Verbal uncertainties, in contrast, did not exert such
signaling effects. Interviewers either did not notice such
uncertainties or chose not to take them into account, possibly attributing them to candidates’ nervousness or anxiety
(Campion & Campion, 1987; cf., Vrij et al., 2010) or finding no way to integrate them into a standardized scoring
guide. Therefore, the indirect path via verbal uncertainties
did not counteract the direct positive effect of deceptive IM.
With these findings, the study contributes to explaining the mixed effects of deceptive IM. First, by applying
signaling theory, we showed how faking serves to send the
positively intended signal of candidates’ suitability but may
come at the cost of unintended negative signals in the form
of deception cues. Most importantly, deceptive IM (and its
subfacets) triggered certain verbal deception cues—lower
plausibility and more verbal uncertainty—similar to the
speech pattern found in lies (DePaulo et al., 2003). In comparison, honest IM (and its subfacets) enhanced plausibility.
With this, deception cues reflected the responses’ honesty,
not the use of IM behavior per se. By showing how verbal
cues from lie detection generalize to IM in employment interviews, we make lies in personnel selection more quantifiable and demonstrate how verbal cues can help distinguish
deceptive from honest IM. Furthermore, results showed
how unintended negative signals counteracted the positive
direct effect of deceptive IM on performance, ensuring that
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deceptive IM forfeits some of its effectiveness due to the
indirect path via plausibility.
Second, this study adds to the literature on signaling
theory by including both sides of the signaling timeline (cf.,
Connelly et al., 2011): senders (candidates) and receivers
(interviewers). Most prior research has only addressed either one or the other perspective. Conceptually, we further
studied a model combining both the intentional positive
signal that signalers want to send and the cause, shape, and
consequences of unintentional negative signals that may
accompany them—a conceptualized but underresearched
topic in signaling theory (Connelly et al., 2011).
Finally, this study complements the literature on
structured interviews. We showed that interviewers took
plausibility into account but neglected verbal uncertainties.
Despite interview standardization, plausibility influenced
interviewers’ ratings of candidates’ responses beyond the
official interview-scoring guide.
In practice, prospective candidates need to know that
faking shows in small verbal cues, visible in altered speech
patterns (e.g., lowered plausibility), on which interviewers
pick up. Therefore, in preparation for job interviews, candidates are better off by truthfully assessing their strengths
and presenting them in the job interview, using honest IM.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Data came from a selection simulation. Though a simulation, such context reflects a well-established paradigm
in personnel selection research, with findings usually generalizable to actual selection situations (Kleinmann et al.,
2011). This context also allows reliable reports of sensitive
data like candidates’ deceptive and honest IM, which might
not be directly measurable in field research.
Further, we used a fully structured interview combining behavioral and situational questions. Although likely
informative for structured interviews overall, we cannot tell
how the process may differ between behavioral and situational questions, nor can we judge our findings’ generalizability to less structured interviews. A comparison across
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interview formats may test our findings’ generalizability.
Previous research suggests structured question formats
elicit differences in IM (e.g., Peeters & Lievens, 2006) but
none in verbal deception cues (cf., Culbertson et al., 2016).
A comparison may also address why interviewers were
responsive to the signal “plausibility” but not to “verbal uncertainties.” If the latter is due to the structured interviews’
purely task-focused scoring guide, that implies one possible
downside to this structured approach. Alternatively, if it is
due to interviewers interpreting verbal uncertainties as a
sign of nervousness or anxiety (McCarthy & Goffin, 2004),
this finding should also extend to less structured interviews.
That said, interview anxiety actually predicts deceptive IM
(Powell et al., 2020). Future research may try to differentiate how much verbal uncertainty in regular interviews
reflect interview anxiety versus deception and how far leniency toward verbal uncertainties may thus be justified or
misplaced.
It might also be interesting to see how consciously interviewers react to such unintended negative signals. Also,
one might study how extending official scoring guides
and/or training interviewers to read lower plausibility and
higher verbal uncertainties as signs of faking impact their
ability to catch fakers and predict candidates’ later job performance. Alternatively, such steps may also incur other biases to the interview (e.g., by discriminating against certain
societal groups).
With our study design, we cannot conclude as to where
in the process verbal uncertainties work or do not as an
unintended signal because we coded verbal deception cues
and interview ratings independently from each other. This
prevents common method bias but does not allow us to
draw direct conclusions of how aware interviewers were of
candidates’ verbal uncertainties.
In the end, we also do not know why honest IM showed
no direct positive effect on interview ratings. Besides error, it may be that among our sample of undergraduate and
master’s level students, the achievements and experiences
available to participants to self-promote were simply not
impressive enough to move interviewers toward higher ratings. If so, then the effects of honest IM may actually grow
more powerful among more experienced candidates than
would be suggested by the current results.
Future research might also study whether deception
cues show specific temporal patterns across a single response or across the interview overall. Lying may come
increasingly fatiguing as the interview continues, possibly
strengthening the relationships between IM and deception
cues.
Finally, future research may address moderators that
enhance or mitigate deceptive IM’s effects on deception
cues. Traits like psychopathy are strongly related to deceptive IM (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017). Also, psychopaths are
masters at manipulating others (e.g., Smith & Lilienfeld,
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2013), which may be reflected in the assumption that they
do not show the typical cues that liars show.
Conclusion
This study asked the question of how interviewers
could “set liars’ pants on fire.” Verbal deception cues of
plausibility and verbal uncertainties subtly differed between
deceptive and honest IM. Particularly, plausibility signaled
to interviewers whether candidates seemed credible. In sum,
by paying attention to verbal deception cues, interviewers
may reward candidates’ honest self-presentation and protect
themselves from falling prey to candidates’ lies.
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